Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against High Court's refusal to order prohibition of appellant's trial for making a threat to kill, violent disorder and assault causing harm, on the grounds that: (a) the conclusion of the trial judge that there was no culpable or blameworthy prosecutorial delay was one that was open to him; (b) the loss of the procedural protection of anonymity due to the appellant no longer being a child by the date of her trial was a significant disadvantage, but it was necessary to balance that against that the seriousness of the case, bearing in mind that the complainant suffered serious injuries and the court did not have jurisdiction to order that the trial should be otherwise than in public; and (c) the appellant's history of mental health difficulties could not be a reason for prohibiting the trial.
Appeal of decision of High Court refusing to prohibit appellant's trial for making a threat to kill, violent disorder and assault causing harm on grounds of prosecutorial delay - contended by appellant that had the criminal investigation been conducted expeditiously she would have been tried prior to her 18th birthday and would have been a child within the meaning of the Children Act 2001 - children entitled to statutory safeguards including anonymity - qualifying criterion for the procedural protections is the age of the accused as of the date of the trial of the offences - trial date adjourned / vacated on a number of occasions - appellant's mental health difficulties - whether trial judge erred in finding that the appellant's right to trial with due expedition had not been breached - whether trial judge erred in finding that there were no exceptional circumstances that made it unfair or unjust to put the appellant on trial - whether trial judge made findings of fact not supported by evidence, including impermissible findings based on hearsay evidence - whether trial judge failed to take proper account of periods of delay - whether trial judge erred in finding that the gardaí had not breached their duty to make reasonable inquiries - whether reasons for delay and appellant's mental health ought to have been considered together rather than separately by the trial judge.