Appeal of deportation decisions by convicted terrorist is not in the public interest

Judicial review – asylum and immigration – application for leave to appeal - fifteen points of law of exceptional public importance - idea seems to be to overwhelm the court into submission by the multiplication of legal complexity - whether a point of law of exceptional public importance arises - where the Refugee Appeals Tribunal determines that there is a substantial risk of serious harm to an applicant for subsidiary protection but that the applicant is otherwise excluded from subsidiary protection status, is any subsequent deportation decision subject to the provision on refoulement under Article 21 (1) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC -deportation is generally not a matter of EU law - fails to reach a bare minimum level of credibility - where the Refugee Appeals Tribunal determines that there is a substantial risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment of (sic) punishment to a person if returned to their country of origin, but that person is excluded from subsidiary protection status on the basis of previous criminal convictions, is the Minister under a duty to follow the Tribunal’s determination unless there is a change of circumstances in the person’s country of origin of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the person no longer faces a real risk of serious harm - not a question of exceptional public importance transcending the facts of these proceedings - tailored to the very specific and unusual facts of the present case – Court held that the Minister was entitled to form the view that there had been a change of circumstances in the country of origin - can the court impugn a decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal as lacking in adequate reasoning where the decision has not been impugned by any other person or body and/or the Refugee Appeals Tribunal is not a party to the proceedings before the court and so is deprived of the opportunity to defend its decision - question misunderstands the substantive decision - applicant would still have lost the case even if the tribunal had provided reasons - not open to a losing party to scour judgments for obiter or minor observations that might be disagreed with - ether judicial review of a Minister’s decision to depart from a finding by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal that a person is at risk of serious harm is an effective remedy in accordance with the State’s duty to ensure an independent assessment of the said risk, and particularly where a statutory independent body (i.e. the Refugee Appeals Tribunal) has reached a contrary conclusion - tailored to the highly exceptional circumstances of the present case - applicant has had an independent and effective remedy in relation to the Minister’s decisions - where the Minister intends to depart from an assessment by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal that a person is at risk of serious harm, is the Minister obliged to put an applicant on notice of that departure prior to the Minister issuing a decision - confined to the very unusual facts of the present case - question does not arise on the facts - applicant was on notice of his possible deportation - is the court obliged to defer to the Executive on the basis of the separation of powers when examining a decision by the Minister on whether there are substantial grounds for believing that a person is at risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if deported – argued that the judgment was unduly deferential to the executive - separation of powers - comments in relation to separation of powers are in line with established law, including Meadows, and do not give rise to any point on which doubt arises such that it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal - where a decision-maker refers to a decision as being ad misericordiam in nature, can that be disregarded by the court on the basis that the court regards it as a ‘boiler plate’ statement - seizing upon isolated phases and comments - the decision was not made on the basis that the application was treated as ad misericordiam - where subsequent or other materials that were not before the Minister making a decision to issue a deportation order under s. 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1999 are put to the Minister in the context of a s. 3(11) decision and raise Article 3 ECHR issues, is it correct that the court has an ‘extremely limited role’ in judicial review of that decision; and, if it does, does that provide an applicant with an effective remedy - does not arise out of decision in this case - general principle has been clearly established that in the s. 3(11) context, the court has an extremely limited role - whether subsequent or other materials that were not before the Minister making a decision to issue a deportation order under s. 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1999 can, in exceptional cases, be considered by a court hearing an application for judicial review of a decision to issue a deportation order under s. 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1999 in order to assess the reasonableness or proportionality of said decision - the applicant did not contend for the proposition that is raised in the question - the materials were all ultimately considered by the Minister - where the applicant raises an arguable breach of an absolute right, is the range of reasonable findings open to the decision maker necessarily more limited than in cases where an arguable breach of an absolute right is not so raised and, if so, is the standard of judicial review applied by the courts more exacting in cases where an arguable breach of an absolute right is raised - a very exacting level of scrutiny has been applied to the Minister’s decision in this case - where the European Court of Human Rights has held that the deportation of particular and specific categories of person to a particular country will violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights at a certain point in time, is the Minister under a duty to address the relevant decision(s) of that court and give express reasons why she considers the deportation of a person who falls within such a particular and specific category to the particular country no longer amounts to a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention in Human Rights - fundamentally misunderstands the Strasbourg process - the court deals with individual allegations of violations - whether the High Court should address for itself the issue of whether the applicant has ‘exhausted domestic remedies’ and, in particular, where this has not been put in issue by the parties - applicant is now essentially seeking an advisory opinion as to whether, if the applicant had pursued certain other points, that would have amounted to an effective remedy - whether a request that the Minister provide further reasons to justify her decision to deport a person who has been held by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal to be at risk of serious harm could possibly constitute an effective remedy - not an issue that arises on the facts because the applicant did not seek to make the case that the Minister should provide further reasons - whether the standard of review applied by the High Court is adequate to provide an effective remedy in a case challenging an administrative decision that arguably breaches the right to be free from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment - key requirements of the process for determining a point of law of exceptional public importance - whether an appeal is in the public interest - not in the public interest that an applicant who has from the outset abused the immigration system of the State should be granted a further mechanism to perpetuate a presence in the country that was achieved by fraud – no point of law of exceptional public importance arises - not in the public interest.