Jury in defamation trial appeared to reach determination prior to recharge by judge

McKechnie J (nem diss): Defamation - publication of article relating to defamatory broadcast - allegation that plaintiff had engaged in sexual activity with government minister in return for obtaining contract of employment - defence of fair comment and qualified privilege - whether the article meant that the plaintiff had had sexual relations with the minister - whether the article meant she had performed sexual favours for the sake of a beneficial contract - separate proceedings against broadcaster - judge's charge to jury - meaning of phrase "bear the meaning" - objection by counsel to definition given by judge - jury sent back to reconsider verdict in light of further direction from judge - whether original charge was correct - whether jury should have been discharged - fair procedures - Section 26 of the Defamation Act 1961 - whether defendant could plead in mitigation of damages that a third party had defamed the plaintiff by the same libel without acknowledging that the article was to the same effect as the radio broadcast.

"Once it becomes necessary for a litigant to seek redress so as to defend or vindicate his rights, including of course the right to one’s good name, which has specific constitutional protection, then as part of the process such person has a constitutional right to fair procedures. This right, in a jury trial, is to have jury issues determined by a body which is unbiased in any of the several ways in which that might come about. In this case, the suggestion under this heading is that prior to the recharge the jury had in fact determined the issue and thus the final verdict was simply a repetition of their declared position made known earlier.
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There cannot, I think, be any dispute but that it is no defence for a defendant, who publishes what is otherwise a libel, to escape its consequences by simply adding a disassociation from what is published. Secondly, likewise it is no defence, in the type of publication mentioned, for the defendant, when repeating what otherwise is a libel, to add a comment dissociating itself from the original and repeated libel. If, as might appear, the defendant in this action was suggesting that its repetition of RTE’s dissociation from the comments made by the caller to Liveline meant that the article was not defamatory, the trial judge should have informed the jury that such a dissociation was no defence."

Dunne J (concurring): Defamation - jury trial - dismissal of action by jury - error in charge to jury - whether verdict properly reached - meaning of words "bear the meaning" - decision reached by jury prior to recharge on the issue - whether implications or inferences to be considered - defence of qualified privilege.

"The circumstances of this case are unusual. When the jury was re-called for the purpose of the final re-charge, the jury were already wearing their coats and when the Judge began to address them by way of the re-charge, the foreman of the jury interrupted to say that they had in fact reached a decision. The jury were then further re-charged and asked to go back and consider their decision. The precise length of time that they re-considered the verdict is not clear from the transcript which only makes reference to a short adjournment. It appears to have been a matter of minutes. What is clear is that the jury did not spend any lengthy period of time reconsidering their verdict following the re-charge."