No substantial risk of unfair trial on grounds of delay to father accused of sexual abuse by daughter

Personal injuries - defendant seeks an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay - claim was initiated by plenary summons dated 15th July, 2011, following an authorisation by the Personal Injuries Assessment Board - statement of claim was delivered on 25t - a notice for particulars was raised by the defendant on 15th November, to which a reply was made on 2nd February, 2012 - judgment in default of defence was sought on 10th May, 2012, following which a defence was delivered on 18th June - defence claims that the action brought by the plaintiff arose more than six years before the commencement of the action and was statute barred pursuant to the provisions of s. 11(2) of the Statute of Limitations Act 1957, as amended - defendant also claimed that the plaintiff had been guilty of inordinate and inexcusable delay in the institution of the proceedings, and that as a result the defendant had suffered prejudice in his defence such that the balance of justice required that they should be dismissed - reply was delivered to the defence on 13th August, 2012, and the discovery process commenced in 2012 and continued through 2013 and 2014, up to and during the course of the hearing of this motion - a notice of trial issued on 11th July, 2013, and a certificate of readiness was issued dated 4th June, 2014 - plaintiff’s claim is for “aggravated, punitive or exemplary” damages for assault constituting physical and sexual abuse and resultant psychological damage - it is alleged that the plaintiff was sexually abused by her father and two older brothers - worst abuse is alleged to have been committed by the defendant continuously until the plaintiff was approximately 15 years old - the particulars of the claim alleged against the defendant state that he first abused her in 1979 when she was approximately five to six years old - principles applicable to an application to dismiss an action for want of prosecution - whether the delay on the part of the person seeking to proceed has been inordinate and if inordinate, whether it has been inexcusable - onus of establishing that delay has been both inordinate and inexcusable lies upon the party seeking to dismiss the claim - if court concludes that the delay has been inordinate and inexcusable, it must then proceed to exercise judgment on whether in its discretion on the facts of the case, the balance of justice is in favour of or against, allowing the case to proceed - no substantial risk of an unfair trial or a likelihood that the defendant has been or will be caused serious prejudice in the preparation or conduct of his defence by reason of the passage of time.