Personal injuries action of former “Magdalene laundries” resident is statute barred

Plaintiff seeking damages for personal injuries - first named defendant seeking order to strike out plaintiff's claim on grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay - whether claim is also statute barred - plaintiff was in industrial school under alleged duress to give child up for adoption - she signed two consent forms for adoption - psychiatrist report indicated that plaintiff suffered whilst in care of industrial schools - she alleges fraud, duress and undue influence on part of first named defendant - claim instituted some forty four years after the events complained of allegedly occurred - is, therefore, prima facie statute barred - counsel for plaintiff seeks to rely on section 71 of the Statute in order to postpone the relevant limitation period - submitted that first defendant concealed details of an informal system which operated in breach of the requirements of section 15(1) of the Adoption Act 1952 in order to prematurely obtain consent from mothers for the adoption of their children - submitted that first defendant’s role in this process only became known to the plaintiff through third party disclosures - counsel for the defendant submits that valid consent for the adoption was given to the Health Authority on the 1st October, 1969 and that this was within the terms of section 15(1) - any consent documents purported to be relied upon by the plaintiff did not permit any adoption to occur and, in any event, were known to the plaintiff - court satisfied that an informal process operated in this case whereby the plaintiff was asked to provide interim consent for the adoption of her child until such time as valid consent could be obtained pursuant to the requirements of the Adoption Act - plaintiff, who was an adult at the time these events occurred, was fully aware of all of the matters now complained of, including the alleged undue influence and duress - she signed an ‘interim’ consent form in May 1969 and provided formal consent in October 1969 - no indication that the first defendant perpetrated a fraud or fraudulently concealed anything from the plaintiff such as would cause section 71 of the Statute to become operative - claim was commenced out of time and is statute barred - delay in commencing the proceedings was both inordinate and inexcusable - plaintiff's claim dismissed.