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Trial should not be prohibited where there is no real risk of unfairness
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Court of Appeal allows Director of Public Prosecution's appeal against orders extending time within which to bring an application for judicial review and prohibiting the respondent's trial, on the grounds that: (a) the respondent’s contentions fell far short of identifying prejudice of such significance and gravity as to give rise to a real risk of an unfair trial that could not be cured by directions given by the trial judge; and (b) the time period for bringing the application had not been reset by a supplemental witness statement and, further, there were no grounds to warrant extending time.
Appeal by the DPP of orders extending time to bring application for judicial review and prohibiting the respondent's trial - respondent alleged to have sexually abused two younger sisters - High Court found that application was in time and in any event there were grounds to extend the time period under O.84, rule 21(3) - order of prohibition on grounds that there was a real risk of an unfair trial because of lack of specificity of dates and unavailability of witnesses - whether time begins to run from return date or date of indictment - whether late disclosure of a supplemental witness statement was such as to start time running again and whether onus on respondent to show this - whether there was risk of unfair trial - whether issue of prejudice ought to have been left over to the trial judge.
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Contrary to the High Court judge’s conclusions the supplemental statement of the complainants’ mother was not demonstrated by the respondent to be a sufficiently significant event as warranted resetting the clock for the purposes of seeking judicial review. In several respects the later statement merely amplified her earlier statement.There was insufficient evidence put before the court by the respondent to warrant it being treated as pivotal to the judge’s granting of an order of prohibition. It was incumbent on the respondent to engage with the facts and demonstrate why the statement per se constituted good and sufficient reason for the extension of time such that the legal test under O. 84 r. 21 is met,
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