No Results Found

The page you requested could not be found. Try refining your search, or use the navigation above to locate the post.

Friday, 24th October, 2025
The High Court dismissed proceedings issued by the borrower against the lender, a receiver, and the entity to which a mortgaged property was ultimately sold, concluding that the borrower's claims—alleging overcharging, breach of consumer law, fraud, harassment, trespass, nuisance, and other torts—disclosed no reasonable cause of action and were bound to fail. The court found that the borrower had borrowed money, defaulted on repayments, and that the receiver was lawfully appointed and entitled to deal with the property in accordance with the mortgage. In addition, the borrower had taken no steps to prosecute the claim for over seven years, and there was no pressing exigency of justice requiring the case to proceed. Consequently, the High Court ordered the lifting of the lis pendens on the property, allowing the lender to exercise its security. The decision reflects an emphasis on both procedural efficiency and the need to prevent abusive litigation tactics.
The Court of Appeal refused an application by the defendants for a stay on the enforcement of costs orders arising from the dismissal of their appeal against three High Court orders. The court found no evidence to support the claim that execution of costs orders was imminent or prejudicial, particularly as adjudication of costs was likely to be protracted and any further Supreme Court appeal would be heard promptly. The court also held that the appellants failed to present any stateable or arguable grounds for appeal, relying instead on vague or misleading assertions and not addressing the reasons given in the judgment under appeal. As a result, the stay was refused and the respondents were awarded the costs of the current application.
The High Court dismissed an appeal by a transport company challenging the imposition of customs duties on the importation of second-hand vehicles from Great Britain after Brexit. The court found that the company was not entitled to returned goods relief or preferential tariff treatment, chiefly because it could not provide the necessary documentation to support its claims and had failed to establish its status as a customs representative rather than an importer. The judge ruled that the loss of Union customs status by operation of law at the end of the Brexit transition period was not equivalent to goods being 'taken out' of the EU for the purposes of returned goods relief, and that the relevant EU legal provisions were clear. The court concluded that the customs authority was correct to treat the company as the liable importer and to require actual proofs of entitlement to any relief, and rejected arguments that requests for documentation were irrational or disproportionate.

Trusted by the judiciary, government lawyers, prosecutors, and many leading counsel.
Click here to request a subscription.

Register Now